The accused, understanding his rights and that they were capable of invocation at any point, had not chosen to invoke them.

Courts have also construed statements as expressing a desire to remain silent only about a particular subject. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam). Miranda and our subsequent cases also require police to "respect the accused's decision to exercise the rights outlined in the warnings." He then made inculpatory statements, which he later sought to suppress on the ground that he had not expressly waived his right to counsel. 190 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol.

8a-9a. The record in this case shows that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. " Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-485 (1981)). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny the petition. Had he wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation. Even in concluding that Miranda does not invariably require an express waiver of the right to silence or the right to counsel, this Court in Butler made clear that the prosecution bears a substantial burden in establishing an implied waiver.

At Thompkins's trial, the prosecution suggested that one of Purifoy's letters appeared to give Thompkins a trial strategy. The Court ignores this aspect of Davis, as well as the decisions of numerous federal and state courts declining to apply a clear-statement rule when a suspect has not previously given an express waiver of rights.7, In my mind, a more appropriate standard for addressing a suspect's ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent is the constraint Mosley places on questioning a suspect who has invoked that right: The suspect's " 'right to cut off questioning' " must be " 'scrupulously honored.' I agree with the Court's statement, so far as it goes. Under AEDPA's deferential standard of review, it is indeed difficult to conclude that the state court's application of our precedents was objectively unreasonable. Here he did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Mosley upheld the admission of statements when police immediately stopped interrogating a suspect who invoked his right to silence, but reapproached him after a 2-hour delay and obtained inculpatory responses relating to a different crime after administering fresh Miranda warnings. Even if some of the cited decisions are themselves in tension with Davis' admonition that a suspect need not " 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don' " to invoke his rights, 512 U. S., at 459 (quoting id., at 476 (opinion of Souter, J.


We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that Thompkins was entitled to habeas relief under both Miranda and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Like the Sixth Circuit, I would not reach this question because Thompkins is in any case entitled to relief as to waiver. The Court in Butler therefore "retreated" from the "language and tenor of the Miranda opinion," which "suggested that the Court would require that a waiver . Cooperation with the police may result in more favorable treatment for the suspect; the apprehension of accomplices; the prevention of continuing injury and fear; beginning steps towards relief or solace for the victims; and the beginning of the suspect's own return to the law and the social order it seeks to protect.

Both protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Miranda, supra, at 467-473, by requiring an interrogation to cease when either right is invoked, Mosley, supra, at 103 (citing Miranda, supra, at 474); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 719 (1979). So that the Thompkins jury could assess Purifoy's credibility and knowledge, the prosecution elicited testimony from Purifoy that he had been tried earlier for the shooting under an aiding-and-abetting theory.

To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant "must show both deficient performance and prejudice." The defense strategy was to pin the blame on Purifoy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had obtained statements after advising Butler of his rights and confirming that he understood them. And it is willing to reach relatively far to do so."
"By bracing against 'the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' " Miranda's prophylactic rules serve to " 'protect the fairness of the trial itself.' Experience suggests the contrary. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. In his later testimony at trial, Helgert remembered the encounter differently. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 421. (a) Thompkins' silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent. 08-1470 ) 547 F. 3d 572, reversed and remanded. Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. [23] It cited from Miranda that: [A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained [...] the fact of lengthy interrogation... before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157, 168 (1986).

Based on this constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination and to prevent coerced testimony by police or other government officials, the Supreme Court ruled in Miranda v. Arizona that an individual who was being held by police and was not free to leave had to be told of his/her right to remain silent. The jury, moreover, was capable of assessing Purifoy's credibility, as it was instructed to do. Id., at 149a, 17a, 19a. The one who is persuaded by honeyed words or moral suasion ... rather than make a last ditch stand, simply loses the protection. In the case of United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 48–51, Freeman, Carol Garfiel, 24 Criminal Justice 48 (2009–2010) [not available online at this time], This page was last edited on 31 August 2020, at 16:08.

The fact that the question referred to religious beliefs also does not render his statement involuntary. Davis' requirement that a suspect must "clearly reques[t] an attorney" to terminate questioning thus aligns with a suspect's likely understanding of the Miranda warnings in a way today's rule does not. The majority in Davis itself approved of this approach as protecting suspects' rights while "minimiz[ing] the chance of a confession [later] being suppressed."

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